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Two experiments are reported which manipulated the representational 
distinctiveness of terms within categorical syllogisms in order to examine the assumption 
of mental models theory that abstract, spatially-based representations underpin deduction. 
In Experiment 1 participants evaluated conclusion validity for syllogisms containing 
either phonologically distinctive terms (e.g., harks, paps and fids) or phonologically non-
distinctive terms (e.g., fuds, fods and feds). Logical performance was enhanced with the 
distinctive contents, suggesting that the phonological properties of syllogism terms can 
play an important role in deduction. In Experiment 2 participants received either the 
phonological materials from Experiment 1, or syllogisms involving distinctive or non-
distinctive visual contents. Logical inference was again enhanced for the distinctive 
contents, whether phonological or visual in nature. Our findings suggest a broad 
involvement of multi-modal information in syllogistic reasoning and question the 
assumed primacy of abstract, spatially-organised representations in deduction as claimed 
by mental models theorists.   
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Phonological and Visual Distinctiveness Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning: 
Implications for Mental Models Theory 
The quest to understand people’s reasoning with categorical syllogisms has been 
active for many years (see Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993, for a review), and studies in 
this area continue unabated (e.g., Espino, Santamaría, Meseguer, & Carreiras, 2005; 
Geurts, 2003; Oberauer, Hörnig, Weidenfeld, & Wilhelm, 2005). Categorical syllogisms 
are deductive problems comprising two premises and a conclusion. For example: Some 
artists are beekeepers; No beekeepers are carpenters; Therefore, Some artists are not 
carpenters. Within the premises there are three terms: the “A term” in the first premise 
(artists), the “C term” in the second premise (carpenters); and the “B term” in both 
premises (beekeepers). A valid conclusion describes the relationship between the A and 
C terms in a way that is necessarily true, given that the premises are true. It is valid as a 
function of the form or structure of the syllogism, not because of the content.  
The terms within syllogisms can appear in four different arrangements or “figures”: 
A-B, B-C and B-A, C-B for asymmetrical figures, and A-B, C-B and B-A, B-C for 
symmetrical figures. The term “mood” is used to refer to the different combinations of 
quantifiers within the premises and conclusion. The four quantifiers in standard 
syllogisms are denoted by letters of the alphabet: A = all, E = no, I = some, and O = 
some…are not. The example syllogism above has the A-B, B-C figure, and the IEO 
mood. Whilst people have little difficulty with certain syllogisms, many others are 
difficult and promote non-logical responses. Explaining the patterns of logical and non-
logical performance that emerge with categorical syllogisms has been a major theoretical 
challenge, and in grappling with conceptual issues theorists have often made assumptions 
about the mental representations that underpin syllogistic inference. In this paper we 
examine the representational assumptions of the mental models theory of syllogistic 
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reasoning (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; see also 
Bara, Bucciarelli, & Lombardo, 2001, for recent refinements and extensions).  
The mental models theory of syllogistic inference continues to dominate the 
literature, not least because of the considerable support that it has received from 
experimental studies of both reasoning development (e.g., Bara, Bucciarelli, & Johnson-
Laird, 1995) and adult performance (e.g., Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 1999). 
Furthermore, unlike other theories (e.g., Rips’, 1994, rule-based account, and Chater & 
Oaksford’s, 1999, probability heuristics model) the mental models theory can provide 
compelling explanations of two central phenomena associated with categorical 
syllogisms: (1) the striking impact of figure on premise-processing latencies (e.g., Espino 
et al., 2005; Stupple & Ball, 2005, 2007); and (2) the systematic influence of conclusion 
believability on acceptance rates and problem processing times (e.g., Ball, Phillips, 
Wade, & Quayle, 2006; Garnham & Oakhill, 2005; Stupple & Ball, 2008; Quayle & Ball, 
2000). Other theories fail to show this breadth of explanatory capability.  
One further aspect of the mental models theory that makes it particularly amenable 
to our interest in representational issues in syllogistic reasoning is that it embodies clear 
assumptions about the representations underpinning deduction. For example, in 
explaining how people evaluate conclusions to presented premises the theory assumes 
that individuals begin by constructing an initial model of the premises, where the terms 
and their categorical relations are represented as abstract tokens organised within two-
dimensional spatial arrays (Johnson-Laird, 1996, 1998, 2005). Such models, moreover, 
are not identified with visual images (because they are abstract), although Johnson-Laird 
(e.g., 1998) has suggested that it may be possible for people to construct an image of 
what a model represents from a certain point of view.  
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To clarify the nature of mental model representations in reasoning consider the 
initial model that an individual might construct for the premises shown earlier. This 
initial model might take the following form (using Johnson-Laird & Byrne’s, 1991, 
notation): 
 a [b]    
    a [b]       
       [c]      
       [c]      
In this notation arbitrary numbers of letter-tokens are used to represent members of 
the categories referred to by the three terms. Tokens on the same row share category 
membership. Hence, this model shows two members of the artists category who are also 
members of the beekeepers category, and two members of the carpenters category who 
are not members of the beekeepers category. The brackets around the tokens signify 
exhaustive representation (i.e., it is not possible to add further tokens to the model for 
these categories). Notice that the A term is not represented exhaustively, suggesting that 
members of the artists category could exist on different rows of the model. Having 
constructed this initial model the reasoner can then determine whether it supports the 
presented conclusion (“Some artists are not carpenters”), which it does. The necessity of 
this conclusion must, however, be tested against fleshed out versions of the initial mental 
model (such as the following) to check whether a counterexample model is possible: 
 a [b]   a [b] 
    a [b]      a [b] 
    a   [c]     a   [c] 
       [c]     a   [c] 
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In the left-hand model an extra token representing the A term has been added to 
show a situation where some artists are carpenters. This model still supports the given 
conclusion “Some artists are not carpenters”. In the model on the right a further A-term 
token has been added to show a possible situation where all carpenters are artists, and, 
again, the given conclusion “Some artists are not carpenters” holds in this final model. 
Whenever a conclusion is not falsified by fleshed-out mental models then it is valid, 
otherwise it is invalid.  
The view that mental models are constructed as abstract tokens within a spatial 
substrate has recently gained support from various lines of research. For example, 
evidence for figural biases and conclusion-order preferences in syllogistic inference 
(Espino, Santamaría, & Garcìa-Madruga, 2000, 2005; Stupple & Ball, 2005, 2007) is 
readily interpretable in terms of extracting information from spatially-organised 
representations. More compelling still is evidence that congenitally blind individuals 
seem to be able to construct spatially-based mental models during reasoning despite their 
lack of visual experience (e.g., Fleming, Ball, Ormerod, & Collins; 2006; Knauff & May, 
2006). Yet another line of evidence comes from studies demonstrating that visual mental 
imagery invoked by problem contents can actually hinder people’s capacity to construct 
and use the abstract spatial models necessary for effective reasoning – so so-called 
“visual imagery impedance hypothesis” (e.g., Knauff & Johnson-Laird, 2002; Knauff & 
May, 2006; Knauff & Schlieder, 2005; see also Bacon, Handley, & McDonald, 2007).  
The research of Knauff and colleagues has been particularly valuable in revealing a 
potential problem with previous studies that have demonstrated inconsistent links 
between imagery and deduction (e.g., Clement & Falmagne, 1986; De Soto, London, & 
Handel, 1965; Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Tabossi, 1989; Shaver, Pierson, & Lang, 1975; 
Sternberg, 1980). Knauff and Johnson-Laird (2002) suggest that this inconsistency 
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derives from an inherent confounding in such studies between materials invoking visual 
imagery and materials invoking spatial representations. Their proposal is that studies 
revealing enhanced reasoning have inadvertently increased the spatial basis of problem 
contents whereas studies showing decrements in reasoning (or sometimes no effect) have 
tended to use materials that invoke visual imagery. Knauff and Johnson-Laird’s 
systematic review of previous experiments gives grounds for accepting the viability of 
their proposal. Likewise, their own empirical evidence for visual impedance in deduction 
is compelling. Nevertheless, we note that this evidence comes from deductive tasks (i.e., 
three- and four-term series problems) where the visual and spatial properties of relations 
have been manipulated (i.e., where visuo-spatial relations such as above–below are 
contrasted with visual relations such as cleaner–dirtier and control relations such as 
smarter–dumber that are neither visual nor spatial). It thus remains unclear whether the 
visual impedance observed with relations will generalise to contents where it is the visual 
properties of the actual terms within problems that are manipulated.  
One aim of the present research was, therefore, to address this latter issue via a 
content manipulation whereby syllogism terms were either visually distinctive or visually 
non-distinctive. It may be the case, for example, that visually distinctive mental tokens 
are advantageous for deductive reasoning since these distinctive tokens are not so easily 
confused within a limited capacity working memory system (see Miyake & Shah, 1999, 
for detailed discussion of the working memory concept). There is, in fact, a range of 
empirical evidence pointing to the benefits of visual distinctiveness in working memory 
that gives grounds for predicting that such distinctiveness may also be advantageous for 
the maintenance and manipulation of representations in deductive reasoning. For 
example, research on immediate recall of unfamiliar Chinese characters shows a visual 
similarity effect, whereby people’s recall reveals confusions for characters that are 
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visually similar to each other (Hue & Ericsson, 1988). This effect also arises for 
immediate recall of visually similar words (e.g., fly, cry, dry) relative to visually distinct 
words (e.g., guy, sigh, lie), as demonstrated by Logie, Della Sala, Wynn, and Baddeley 
(2000). Further evidence for the visual similarity effect comes from developmental 
research (Hitch, Halliday, Schaafstal, & Schraagen, 1988), where young children show 
confusion errors in recognition memory for visually similar pictures (e.g., a pen, a rake 
and a brush) relative to visually distinct pictures (e.g., a pen, a ball, and a pig).   
In summary, then, the evidence for visual similarity effects in immediate memory 
retrieval suggests that visually distinctive terms may also be beneficial in maintaining 
visually-based mental representations in deductive reasoning. Moreover, if a visual 
distinctiveness manipulation was indeed observed to have an advantageous effect on 
deductive accuracy then the assumption that deduction is always based on models 
involving highly abstract entities would seem questionable. On the other hand, if the 
visual impedance hypothesis captures a generic inhibitory effect on model-based 
reasoning that arises because of visual distraction then this distraction should presumably 
occur more with visually distinctive terms that lend themselves to imagery-based 
representations compared with visually non-distinctive terms that should be coded using 
more abstract representations.  
A second aim of the present research was to explore the influence of distinctive 
phonological representations in syllogistic inference. Our interest here parallels that 
described above in relation to visualisable terms, that is, do phonologically distinctive 
terms within syllogisms impede or facilitate reasoning? It is possible that phonologically 
distinctive terms might be beneficial for mental model construction and reasoning since 
such distinctiveness would help clarify the nature of category membership denoted by 
such terms and facilitate the maintenance of information in working memory. In contrast, 
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since the mental models theory emphasises the role of spatially-organised, abstract tokens 
in deduction then the inherent phonological distinctiveness of presented terms might be 
expected to have a distracting effect on reasoning along similar lines to that proposed 
according to the visual impedance hypothesis. Again, the working memory literature 
provides evidence to motivate the prediction that phonological distinctiveness of 
presented terms may, in fact, be beneficial for reasoning. In particular, a key phenomenon 
that has long been established in relation to working memory retrieval is the phonological 
similarity effect (e.g., Baddeley, 1966; Conrad, 1964; Conrad & Hull, 1964), whereby 
immediate serial recall of items that have a similar sound (e.g., the words cat, map, man, 
cap, mad) is much more difficult than immediate serial recall of items that have a 
dissimilar sound (e.g., pit, day, pen, cow, hot). As with the visual similarity effect, the 
phonological similarity effect is likewise assumed to arise because similar items have 
fewer distinguishing features, and hence are likely to be confused whilst being 
maintained within a limited capacity working memory system (Baddeley, Eysenck, & 
Anderson, 2009).  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 set out to address the phonological distinctiveness issue described 
above, that is, do phonologically distinctive syllogistic terms have a facilitatory or 
distracting effect on deductive reasoning in comparison with phonologically non-
distinctive terms? To avoid confounds arising from presented terms being associated 
either with pre-existing concepts in long-term memory or with visualisable objects or 
entities, all terms in Experiment 1 concerned short nonsense words (e.g., jeks, toks, bebs).  
Method 
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Participants. An opportunity sample of 55 female and 29 male participants was 
tested. The mean age of participants was 27.36 years (SD = 11.18). None of the 
participants had taken formal instruction in logic and all were tested individually. 
Materials. Eight multiple-model target syllogisms were presented to each 
participant, four in the A-B, B-C figure and IEO mood, and four in the B-A, C-B figure 
and EIO mood. For both figures half of the conclusions were in the C-A direction and 
half in the A-C direction. This ensured that half of the conclusions were logically valid 
and the other half were indeterminately invalid (i.e., consistent with the premises, but not 
necessitated by them). Across both figures half of the valid syllogisms involved 
phonologically distinctive contents and half involved phonologically non-distinctive 
contents. The same content manipulation was applied to the invalid syllogisms. 
The terms within the syllogisms were all one-syllable, nonsense adjectives. In this 
way word-length was controlled and it was simple to produce terms that were either 
phonologically non-distinctive or phonologically distinctive. The phonologically non-
distinctive terms were words with the same beginning and end consonants, but with 
different middle vowels (e.g., juks, jeks and jiks). The phonologically distinctive terms 
were words with different beginning and end consonants, and also different middle vowel 
sounds (e.g., zaps, toks, and yugs). Four sets of phonologically distinctive terms were 
generated as well as four sets of phonologically non-distinctive terms (see Table 1). 
Appendix A lists the full set of eight target syllogisms used in Experiment 1. 
***Table 1 about here*** 
To validate the effectiveness of our phonological distinctiveness manipulation we 
carried out a pre-test using 15 undergraduate students who received payment for their 
participation. Each participant was given a booklet containing the four sets of distinctive 
phonological terms and the four sets of non-distinctive phonological terms as shown in 
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Table 1. Each page of the booklet presented a single set of three terms with a series of 
rating tasks below the terms. The scales for these rating tasks were 100mm horizontal 
lines with labelled ends-points. Participants were asked to register a judgement on each 
scale with a vertical line. The order of the three terms on each page was independently 
randomised for each participant, as was the order of the term-sets within each booklet. 
Participants were asked to imagine that the presented words denoted the names of 
fictitious monsters.  
The first rating task was in response to the question “How phonologically 
distinctive are the spoken forms of these words?”, with the presented scale ranging from 
“Not at all phonologically distinctive” to “Highly phonologically distinctive”. Scores 
indicated a strong separation in the expected direction between the phonologically 
distinctive items (M = 64.3, SD = 21.3) and the phonologically non-distinctive items (M 
= 27.6, SD = 18.6), F(1, 14) = 23.90, MSE = 421.86, p < .001,  Șp2 = 0.63.  
The second rating task was in response to the question “To what extent do these 
words relate to real words that you are familiar with?”, with the scale ranging from “Not 
at all related” to “Highly related”. Scores here supported our expectation that participants 
would view neither the phonologically distinctive item sets (M = 42.2, SD = 16.3) nor the 
phonologically non-distinctive item sets (M = 49.8, SD = 18.2) as relating strongly to 
familiar words, with there also being no reliable separation in ratings between item sets, 
F(1, 14) = 2.92, MSE = 149.03, p = .11, Șp2 = 0.17.  
The final rating task asked the question “To what extent do these words allow you 
to build up vivid mental images of the fictitious monsters that they denote?”, with the 
scale ranging from “Very easy to build up vivid mental images” to “Very difficult to 
build up vivid mental images”. Again, there was no reliable difference between the 
visualisability of terms in the phonologically distinctive item-sets (M = 40.6, SD = 19.1) 
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compared with the visualisability of terms in the phonologically non-distinctive item-sets 
(M = 43.2, SD = 15.6), F(1, 14) = 0.14, MSE = 374.01, p = .71, Șp2 = 0.01, with scores 
indicating that relatively low visualisability of terms was the norm.  
Overall, the pre-test data support the view that our two sets of terms were 
effectively differentiated in relation to the distinctiveness of their phonological 
properties, whilst also being well matched on dimensions relating to semantic 
associations and visual imagery. In addition, both of the latter indices were below the 
mid-point of the scales in all cases, suggesting that these items were not strongly linked 
to semantic associations or vivid mental images.  
Design. A repeated-measures design was used, with all participants receiving the 
eight target syllogisms, preceded by two single-model problems as practice items. The 
eight target problems were presented in a random order, which was rotated so that each 
problem appeared once in each serial position (creating eight versions of the test booklet). 
There were two independent variables: logic, with two levels (valid vs. invalid 
conclusions), and phonological distinctiveness, with two levels (distinctive vs. non-
distinctive contents). Participants were required either to accept or reject presented 
conclusions. 
Procedure. Participants were presented with the syllogisms in test booklets along 
with the following instructions: “This is an experiment to test people’s reasoning ability. 
You will be given 10 problems. On each page you will be shown two statements 
describing monsters and you will be asked if a conclusion (given below the statements) 
may be logically deduced from the two statements. You should answer this question on 
the assumption that the two statements are, in fact, true. If, and only if, you judge that the 
conclusion necessarily follows from the statements, you should tick the ‘true’ box, 
otherwise tick the ‘false’ box. Please take your time and be sure that you have the right 
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answer before moving on to the next problem. You must not make notes or draw 
diagrams to help you in this task”. 
Results 
The percentage of conclusions accepted as a function of logic (valid vs. invalid) 
and phonological distinctiveness (distinctive vs. non-distinctive) are presented in Table 2. 
It is clear that participants find these syllogisms difficult as evidenced by the generally 
high acceptance rates for conclusions irrespective of logical validity (i.e., people accept 
many more invalid conclusions than they should do according to logical standards of 
reasoning). We note, however, that a bias toward acceptance of invalid conclusions is a 
standard aspect of syllogistic reasoning performance (e.g., Evans et al., 1993), and that 
the acceptance rates in Experiment 1 are within the normal range associated with 
multiple-model problems, which are the most difficult of all syllogism types (Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 1991).  
A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test indicated that significantly more valid conclusions 
were accepted than invalid ones (z = 2.44, p < .01). Separate Wilcoxon tests revealed that 
the effect of logic was reliable for syllogisms with phonologically distinctive contents (z 
= 3.24, p < .001), but was not reliable for syllogisms with phonologically non-distinctive 
contents (z = 1.24, p = .107).  
To confirm the existence of an interaction between logic and phonological 
distinctiveness, scores for the invalid problems were subtracted from scores for the valid 
problems across participants to give an index of the size of the logic effect for the 
distinctive contents versus the non-distinctive contents. A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test 
demonstrated that the effect of logic differed between these two types of phonological 
contents in line with the presence of an interaction effect (z = 2.01, p < .05).  
***Table 2 about here*** 
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Discussion 
In Experiment 1 the use of nonsense terms within syllogisms meant that such terms 
had no obvious links to known visualisable concepts. As such, the phonological 
distinctiveness manipulation in the experiment was a relatively pure one, with limited 
contamination from prior visual or semantic associations. With such controls in place the 
results indicated that conclusion evaluation performance was logically superior for the 
phonologically distinctive problem contents in comparison with the phonologically non-
distinctive contents. This evidence appears to support the assumption that phonologically 
distinctive terms are easier to represent and process during task performance, as predicted 
in light of previous demonstrations of phonological similarity effects in working memory 
(Baddeley et al., 2009). 
The observation that a phonological distinctiveness manipulation can have an 
impact on syllogistic performance (improving logical responding for distinctive terms 
relative to non-distinctive terms) runs counter to the assumption that mental models 
reflect purely abstract, token-based representations within spatial layouts (e.g., Johnson-
Laird, 2005). According to this latter view surface-level properties of syllogisms such as 
the phonology of presented terms should have little relevance to the effectiveness of a 
model-based reasoning strategy. The results of Experiment 1 suggest, therefore, that the 
representational assumptions of mental models theory may need to be reconsidered. We 
return to this issue in the general discussion after reporting our second experiment. 
Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that distinctiveness effects arising from the 
phonological properties of presented terms can facilitate syllogistic reasoning within a 
conclusion evaluation paradigm. In Experiment 2 we aimed to replicate the phonological 
distinctiveness effect observed in Experiment 1 whilst also turning our attention to the 
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visual properties of presented syllogistic terms in another experimental condition. Knauff 
and Johnson-Laird’s (2002) visual imagery impedance hypothesis claims that the visual 
imagery arising from problem contents can hinder people’s capacity to construct and use 
the abstract spatial models that are necessary and sufficient for effective reasoning. 
Whilst evidence from studies that manipulate the visualisability of relational information 
within problems supports this hypothesis (e.g., Knauff and Johnson-Laird, 2002; Knauff 
& May, 2006) it remains unclear whether visual impedance will also arise when the 
actual terms within syllogisms are manipulated. Indeed, as with the phonological 
distinctiveness effect observed in Experiment 1, it may likewise be that terms that evoke 
distinctive mental imagery will provide a firmer foundation for syllogistic inference than 
terms that are visually non-distinctive. Such beneficial effects of visual distinctiveness on 
reasoning would be in line with evidence for a visual similarity effect in working memory 
discussed earlier (e.g., Logie et al., 2000). 
To create visually-pure terms for use in Experiment 2 we generated bespoke 
symbols that involved straight lines, wavy lines, angles and circles (Table 3). These 
symbols were inserted into syllogisms as terms in the place of written words. By 
producing such symbol-based syllogisms our aim was to ensure that prior associations 
with either phonological or semantic representations were minimised. In addition, by 
using symbolic materials in one condition alongside phonological materials in another 
condition it was possible not only to test Knauff and Johnson-Laird’s (2002) visual 
imagery impedance hypothesis but also to contrast the impact of the visual versus 
phonological distinctiveness manipulation upon reasoning performance. If visual and 
phonological distinctiveness influence reasoning differently then this would emerge as a 
three-way interaction between logic (valid vs. invalid conclusions), distinctiveness 
(distinctive vs. non-distinctive terms), and content (visual vs. phonological). In other 
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words, the expectation would be for the two-way interaction observed with the 
phonological materials in Experiment 1 to be replicated, whilst a larger, smaller, non-
existent, or reverse two-way interaction would be seen with the visual materials (the latter 
indicating visual impedance). Conversely, if visual and phonological distinctiveness have 
equivalent, beneficial influences on reasoning, then a two-way interaction between logic 
and distinctiveness would be present, but no three-way interaction. 
***Table 3 about here*** 
Method 
Participants. An opportunity sample comprising 67 female and 42 male participants 
was tested. The mean age of participants was 31.1 years (SD = 13.2). None of the 
participants had taken formal instruction in logic and all were tested individually. 
Materials. The logical forms of the problems in Experiment 2 were identical to 
those in Experiment 1. Syllogisms contained either phonological or visual terms. The 
phonological terms were the same one-syllable, nonsense words used in Experiment 1. 
The symbolic terms were simple symbols (see Table 3) comprising two component parts, 
which we refer to as a “base element” and a “floating element” (e.g., a big oval and a 
smaller circle; an angle and a small line). The visually non-distinctive syllogisms were 
those where the A-, B- and C-term symbols contained an identical base element, but 
where the relative location or orientation of the single floating element varied between 
the three terms (see Symbol Sets 1 to 4 in Table 3). Visually distinctive syllogisms were 
drawn from the same pool of symbols but it was ensured that the A-, B- and C-terms 
were always distinct from one another (see Symbol Sets 5 to 8 in Table 3).  
To confirm the effectiveness of our visual distinctiveness manipulation we carried 
out a pre-test using 15 undergraduate students who received payment for their 
participation. Each participant was given a booklet containing the four sets of distinctive 
  Phonological and Visual Distinctiveness 
 17 
visual terms and the four sets of non-distinctive visual terms as depicted in Table 3. Each 
page of the booklet presented a single set of three symbols with a series of rating tasks 
below the terms. All rating scales were 100mm horizontal lines with labelled ends-points. 
The order of the three symbols on each page was independently randomised for each 
participant, as was the order of the symbol-sets within each booklet. Participants were 
asked to imagine that the symbols denoted membership of fictitious tribes.  
The first rating task was in response to the question “How visually distinctive are 
these symbols?”, with the presented scale ranging from “Not at all visually distinctive” to 
“Highly visually distinctive”. As predicted, scores revealed a marked separation between 
the visually distinctive item sets (M = 88.2, SD = 9.8) and the visually non-distinctive 
item sets (M = 21.3, SD = 17.7), F(1, 14) = 108.02, MSE = 310.75, p < .001, Șp2 = 0.89.  
The second rating task was in response to the question “To what extent do these 
symbols relate to real symbols that you are familiar with?”, with the scale ranging from 
“Not at all related” to “Highly related”. Scores here confirmed that participants viewed 
neither the visually distinctive item sets (M = 46.0, SD = 16.4) nor the visually non-
distinctive item sets (M = 42.6, SD = 19.8) as relating particularly closely to familiar 
symbols, F(1, 14) = 0.34, MSE =  255.73, p = .57, Șp2 = 0.02.  
The third rating task requested a response to the question “To what extent do these 
symbols remind you of words that you are familiar with?”, with the scale ranging from 
“Not at all” to “Very much”. Scores supported the prediction that neither the visually 
distinctive item sets (M = 29.4, SD = 15.8) nor the visually non-distinctive item sets (M = 
29.9, SD = 19.7) were inclined to remind participants of known words, F(1, 14) = 0.02, 
MSE =  105.65, p = .89, Șp2 = 0.01. 
The final rating task asked the question “To what extent do these symbols allow 
you to build up vivid mental images of tribal membership categories?”, with the scale 
  Phonological and Visual Distinctiveness 
 18 
ranging from “Very easy to build up vivid mental images” to “Very difficult to build up 
vivid mental images”. As anticipated, the visually distinctive item sets afforded 
significantly better mental imagery (M = 67.0, SD = 19.3) than the visually non-
distinctive item sets (M = 48.3, SD = 23.7), F(1, 14) = 4.76, MSE =  549.10, p = .047, Șp2 
= 0.25.  
Overall, the pre-test data support the view that our novel symbolic terms were 
effectively polarised in terms of their visual distinctiveness and their capacity to facilitate 
the construction of vivid mental images of denoted categories. At the same time, the two 
sets of symbols were well matched on dimensions relating to both known symbols or 
known words, with measures on these dimensions being uniformly below the mid-point 
of the respective scales.  
Design. A mixed design was used. For one group of participants the syllogisms had 
phonological content (see Appendix A for a list of the phonological target problems 
used), and for the other group the syllogisms had visual content (see Appendix B for a list 
of the visual target problems). In addition to this between-participants factor there were 
two repeated-measures factors: logic, with two levels (valid vs. invalid conclusions), and 
distinctiveness, with two levels (distinctive vs. non-distinctive contents). Participants 
were required either to accept or reject the conclusion that was presented with each 
syllogism. The eight target problems that were given to each participant were presented 
in a random order. This order was rotated so that each problem appeared once in each 
serial position, creating eight versions of the test booklet for each type of content. These 
target problems were preceded by two, one-model practice syllogisms. 
Procedure. Instructions for the participants who received the phonological 
syllogisms were the same as those used in Experiment 1. For the visual syllogisms the 
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following scenario was used to provide participants with a conceptual basis for the 
symbolic problem contents:  
“This is an experiment to examine people’s reasoning ability. Please read the 
following instructions carefully.  
In the Zimporian jungle live many small tribes. Each tribe uses a different symbol 
to identify its members. For example: 
      and  
Due to marriages between members of different tribes, some individuals are 
members of more than one tribe. For example: 
Some are ,  and All are  
However, some tribes do not allow marriages with members of certain other tribes. 
Consequently: 
No  are ,  and No are  
You have recently been appointed British Ambassador to Zimporia. It is important, 
therefore, that you have some practice in using Zimporian tribal symbols, and 
understanding the relationships between tribes. To help you with this, you will be given 
10 problems. On each page, you will be shown two statements describing the 
relationships between tribes. 
You are asked if certain conclusions (given below the statements) may be logically 
deduced from the two statements. You should answer this question on the assumption 
that the two statements are, in fact, true. If, and only if, you judge that the conclusion 
necessarily follows from the statements, you should tick the ‘true’ box, otherwise tick the 
‘false’ box. For example: 
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No are  
All are  
Therefore,  No are  
True(   )      False(    ) 
Please take your time and be sure that you have the right answer before moving on 
to the next problem. You must not make notes or draw diagrams to help you in this task. 
Thank you very much for participating”. 
Results 
The percentages of conclusions accepted as a function of content, distinctiveness 
and logic are presented in Table 4. A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test showed that overall, 
significantly more valid conclusions were accepted than invalid ones (z = 2.90, p < .01). 
Separate Wilcoxon tests revealed that this effect of logic was reliable with the distinctive 
problem contents (z = 3.57, p < .001), but was not reliable with non-distinctive problem 
contents (z = 1.30, p = .19). To validate the apparent interaction between logic and 
distinctiveness, scores for the invalid problems were subtracted from scores for the valid 
problems across participants to give an index of the size of the logic effect for the 
distinctive versus the non-distinctive problem contents. A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test 
indicated that the logic effect differed significantly between the distinctive and non-
distinctive contents (z = 2.11, p < .05).  
***Table 4 about here*** 
To test for a three-way interaction between content, logic and distinctiveness we 
computed two-way interaction indices for each problem content by subtracting the logic 
indices for the non-distinctive problems from the logic indices scores for the distinctive 
problems. The two-way interaction indices for participants receiving the phonological 
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contents did not differ significantly from those for participants receiving the visual 
contents (z = 0.28, p = .39), indicating the absence of a three-way interaction. Note, 
however, that the logic by distinctiveness interactions for each content type (i.e., 
phonological or visual) were both reliable (ps < .05), confirming that the distinctiveness 
effect was present in each group separately.  
Discussion 
The observation of a two-way interaction between logic and distinctiveness in 
Experiment 2 successfully replicated the results of Experiment 1, which showed a greater 
logic effect for phonologically distinctive syllogistic contents relative to phonologically 
non-distinctive contents. Moreover, since the size of the logic by distinctiveness 
interaction evident with the phonological materials in Experiment 2 did not differ 
significantly from the size of the same interaction with the visual materials (i.e., there 
was no three-way interaction), it seems that it is distinctiveness per se that affects 
syllogistic reasoning performance. In other words, representational distinctiveness has a 
generic beneficial influence on deductive inference that is not restricted to one particular 
representational modality.  
The results from the visual materials in Experiment 2 also run counter to the visual 
imagery impedance hypothesis (e.g., Knauff & Johnson-Laird, 2002), since this 
hypothesis would presumably predict that the mental imagery evoked by distinctive 
visual contents would hinder people’s reasoning with abstract mental models. However, 
the opposite result was seen to be case in Experiment 2: Distinctive visual contents led to 
the emergence of improved logical inference relative to non-distinctive visual contents. 
This finding is concurs with evidence for visually distinctive items effects having a 
positive influence on immediate retrieval from working memory (e.g., Logie et al., 2000).  
General Discussion
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In accounting for syllogistic reasoning performance and its inherent biases (e.g., 
figural effects and conclusion order preferences), the mental models theory assumes that 
syllogisms – like other deductive problems – are mentally represented as abstract tokens 
within spatially-organised models (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1996, 1998, 2005). Some of the 
most compelling evidence supporting the role of abstract, spatially-based representations 
in deduction derives from the recent research of Knauff and colleagues using transitive 
inference problems (e.g., Knauff & Johnson-Laird, 2002; Knauff & May, 2006). This 
latter work has successfully demonstrated how the mental imagery arising from visually-
evocative relational terms (e.g., cleaner than; dirtier than) can slow down people’s 
ability to reason relative to conditions where relational terms are less visualisable but can 
nonetheless be envisaged spatially (e.g., further north than; further south than). Knauff 
and Johnson-Laird (2002) suggest that this visual imagery impedance effect arises 
because a relation such as that which occurs in the premise “the ape is dirtier than the 
cat” can elicit vivid visual details (e.g., an ape caked with mud) that are irrelevant to the 
inference. As such it is proposed that “It will then take additional time to retrieve the 
information needed to construct the appropriate mental model for making the inference” 
(Knauff & Johnson-Laird, 2002, p. 370).  
Despite this compelling evidence for the abstract, spatial basis of mental models in 
deduction our research was motivated by the possibility that the visual impedance effect 
may be limited to cases where it is the visual properties of relations between problem 
terms that are manipulated as opposed to the visual properties of the actual terms 
themselves. Whilst we agree that the visualisability of relations can engender imagery 
that is irrelevant to the reasoning task, it nevertheless seemed likely to us that terms that 
are easier to represent as distinctive, concrete entities could facilitate model construction 
and reasoning compared with terms that are more difficult to represent in a distinctive 
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visual manner. Likewise, in setting up our research we also wondered whether terms that 
have distinctive phonological properties might likewise enable more effective model 
construction and reasoning than terms that have less distinctive phonological properties, 
which could make such terms more confusable. The potential for phonological and visual 
distinctiveness to benefit reasoning has a precedent in research on immediate retrieval 
from working memory, where it has been established that phonologically or visually 
distinctive items are more accurately recalled than phonologically or visually similar 
items (e.g., Baddeley et al, 2009; Logie et al., 2000).  
Our first experiment set out to explore whether the phonological distinctiveness of 
syllogistic terms might impact upon reasoning effectiveness in a conclusion evaluation 
paradigm. The findings supported the view that phonologically distinctive problem 
content can enhance reasoning relative to phonologically non-distinctive content. Our 
second experiment replicated this phonological distinctiveness effect and also 
demonstrated an equivalent distinctiveness effect for visually-based syllogisms, whereby 
logical responding was more marked for syllogisms based around distinctive visual terms 
compared with syllogisms that involved non-distinctive visual terms. These latter 
findings run counter to the visual imagery impedance hypothesis (e.g., Knauff & 
Johnson-Laird, 2002), instead supporting the view that categorised terms that can be 
represented as distinct visual entities can facilitate deduction.  
Taken together, our results seem to question the idea that categorised terms are 
necessarily represented within mental models as purely abstract tokens, since such tokens 
would only be truly abstract if they were amodal and were associated with neither 
phonological nor visual codes. Our data may instead support the idea that without 
distinctive phonological and visual information individuals will struggle to construct, 
manipulate and evaluate the mental tokens that underpin deductive inferences. This is 
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arguably because the representational boundaries between categories remain vague if 
they are non-distinctive, such that the processing of represented information becomes a 
muddled endeavour. Indeed, for the syllogisms that contained phonologically or visually 
non-distinctive terms participants appeared to demonstrate difficulty in establishing the 
validity of presented conclusions, instead showing a bias toward conclusion acceptance 
irrespective of logical correctness. In contrast, when distinctive phonological or visual 
information is available it appears that this information may clarify the representational 
boundaries between categories such that reasoning can proceed more effectively. 
Our evidence for the involvement of phonological and visual representations in 
syllogistic inference also concurs with another body of recent research that has examined 
the role of working memory subsystems in deduction. For example, Gilhooly (2004), in 
reviewing studies that have manipulated the nature of secondary task loads imposed on 
reasoners whilst attempting primary syllogistic tasks, notes that four out of five 
experiments implicate the involvement of the phonological loop subsystem (which is 
specialised for the representation and processing of phonological information), whilst 
three out of these five experiments implicate a role for the visuo-spatial sketchpad 
subsystem (which deals with visually and spatially coded information). Overall, the 
picture emerging from dual task studies suggests that multi-modal representations may 
well be associated with syllogistic inference. Again, this view departs somewhat from the 
assumed primacy of abstract, spatially-based representations in deduction as espoused by 
mental model theorists (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2005).  
Interestingly, too, some mental models theorists have recently started to distance 
themselves from the claim that models entail purely abstract representations. For example, 
Schaeken, Van Der Henst, and Schroyens (2006) have proposed that reasoners can 
construct “isomeric” mental models of presented premises in order to represent 
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indeterminacies and uncertainties. An isomeric model captures all possibilities within a 
single, integrated representation via the addition of concrete, non-spatial elements (i.e., 
propositional or verbal “tags”) that can denote uncertainty. Another, similar notion 
espoused by Vandierendonck, Dierckx, and De Vooght (2004) is that of “annotated” 
mental models, where annotations are verbal footnotes that act to qualify the meaning of 
information represented within spatially-based models.  
Isomeric and annotated models entail rich, multi-dimensional representations that 
combine verbal and visuo-spatial elements within a single, integrated format. These 
recent ideas – when viewed in conjunction with evidence from dual task studies and our 
present experiments – lead us to wonder whether the involvement of multi-modal 
information in model-based reasoning may be a typical occurrence in many reasoning 
contexts, such that reasoners will capitalise on whatever information is available to help 
with the construction, maintenance and manipulation of representations during deduction. 
Sometimes such multi-modal information may lead to reasoning difficulties, as is the 
case with the impedance arising when visually-evocative transitive relations engender 
imagery that detracts from relational processing. At other times, however, visual and 
phonological information can facilitate reasoning, as in situations where the categorised 
terms referred to in problems are visually or phonologically distinctive.  
Notwithstanding the evidence that we have presented we acknowledge that 
theorists who are committed to the view that mental models are based around abstract 
entities could still counter that we have merely demonstrated the benefit of visual and 
phonological information for premise processing rather than for model-based 
representation and reasoning, which might still rely exclusively on abstract spatial 
representations. At first sight this proposal appears to lead to an unfalsifiable theory in 
that whenever evidence is obtained for visual and phonological effects in deduction these 
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effects can be relegated to an initial premise processing stage, whereas evidence for 
spatial involvement can be ascribed to a subsequent model-based reasoning stage. 
Neuroimaging studies may, however, be able to arbitrate successfully on this issue. It 
could be the case, for example, that early premise processing of visualisable materials 
activates visual brain areas, whereas subsequent processing that reflects the extraction of 
abstract mental codes would activate more spatial brain areas. There is, in fact, some 
evidence supporting this latter position (e.g., Fangmeier, Knauff, Ruff, & Sloutsky, 2006; 
Knauff, Fangmeier, Ruff, & Johnson-Laird, 2003), although at the moment it is too early 
to tell whether such evidence will generalises to a variety of deduction paradigms and 
content manipulations. We nevertheless agree that neuroimaging research is likely to 
reveal important insights that will help clarify whether deduction arises through stages of 
processing that culminate in abstract, model-based representations.  
This latter, staged view of reasoning also derives some support from pioneering 
studies of spatial reasoning conducted by Mani and Johnson-Laird (1982). In these 
studies participants were observed to retain resilient verbatim representations of verbally-
presented ‘multiple model’ problems (i.e., problems that required two or more mental 
models for a complete representation of terms and relations), but not for single-model 
problems that were not open to alternative model-based representations. Mani and 
Johnson-Laird’s evidence suggests that people are highly sensitive to the phonological 
properties of multiple-model problems, even though inferential processing may itself 
revolve around subsequently constructed abstract models rather than initial verbatim 
traces. We note, too, that all of the syllogistic tasks used in our present research were 
multiple-model problems, which may, therefore, have demanded some initial 
maintenance of phonological or visual representations prior to eventual model 
construction. This initial maintenance of surface level information may provide a locus 
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for the phonological and visual distinctiveness effects that we have observed, whilst 
leaving intact the assumption that models themselves are primarily abstract, spatially-
based representations.  
Still, it seems valuable to keep sight of alternatives to this staged view of the 
representations underpinning deduction, especially in light of the recent theorising 
discussed previously which emphasises the possible role in reasoning of isomeric or 
annotated models that involve multi-modal representations. The possibility that reasoning 
involves the construction and manipulation of multi-dimensional representations within a 
single, dynamic storage system that is capable of seamlessly integrating both 
phonological and visuo-spatial information seems very attractive to us. As least some of 
the appeal here derives from the links that we see to interesting developments in the field 
of working memory research, particularly Baddeley’s (2000, 2002) proposals that an 
“episodic buffer” may be needed as part of the working memory system in order to 
provide temporary storage so as to maintain unitary episodic representations of multi-
dimensional information. Indeed, Baddeley himself draws connections between reasoning 
and the concept of the episodic buffer when he states that the buffer “…allows multiple 
sources of information to be considered simultaneously, creating a model of the 
environment that may be manipulated to solve problems and plan future behaviours 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983)” (Baddeley, 2002, p. 92).  
There is clearly much work yet to be done to determine whether syllogistic 
inference is best explained as involving integrated, multi-dimensional models located 
within some episodic storage system, or as involving abstract, amodal, spatially-based 
models that are extracted after a stage of initial premise processing. At the very least our 
data support the view that distinctive phonological and visual contents can influence the 
effectiveness of syllogistic inference. As such, we suggest that effects arising from the 
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surface level features of presented problems need to given very serious consideration 
when deriving theoretical accounts of the representations that underpin deduction.   
  Phonological and Visual Distinctiveness 
 29 
Author Note 
We thank Natalie Gundry, Richard Nakielny, Karen Matthews and Rachael 
Tidswell for their assistance in data collection. We are also grateful for the many valuable 
comments on previous versions of this paper provided by Klaus Oberauer, Kinga 
Morsanyi and three anonymous reviewers.  
 
  Phonological and Visual Distinctiveness 
 30 
References 
Bacon, A. M., Handley, S. J., & McDonald, E. L. (2007). Reasoning and dyslexia: 
A spatial strategy may impede reasoning with visually rich information. British Journal 
of Psychology, 98, 79-92. 
Baddeley, A. D. (1966). Short-term memory for word sequences as a function of 
acoustic, semantic and formal similarity. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
18, 362-365. 
Baddeley, A. D. (2000). The episodic buffer: A new component of working 
memory? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 417-423. 
Baddeley, A. D. (2002). Is working memory still working? European Psychologist, 
7, 85-97. 
Baddeley, A. D., Eysenck, M. W., & Anderson, M. C. (2009). Memory. Hove, UK: 
Psychology Press. 
Ball, L. J., Phillips, P., Wade, C. N., & Quayle, J. D. (2006). Effects of belief and 
logic on syllogistic reasoning: Eye-movement evidence for selective processing models.  
Experimental Psychology, 53, 77-86. 
Bara B. G., Bucciarelli M., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1995). Development of 
syllogistic reasoning. American Journal of Psychology, 109, 157-193. 
Bara B. G., Bucciarelli M., & Lombardo V. (2001). Mental model theory of 
deduction: A unified computational approach. Cognitive Science, 25, 839-901.  
Bucciarelli, M., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1999). Strategies in syllogistic reasoning. 
Cognitive Science, 23, 247-303. 
Chater, N., & Oaksford, M. (1999). The probability heuristics model of syllogistic 
reasoning. Cognitive Psychology, 38, 191-258. 
  Phonological and Visual Distinctiveness 
 31 
Clement, C. A., & Falmagne, R. J. (1986). Logical reasoning, world knowledge, 
and mental imagery: Interconnections in cognitive processes. Memory and Cognition, 14, 
299-307. 
Conrad, R. (1964). Acoustic confusion in immediate memory. British Journal of 
Psychology, 55, 75-84. 
Conrad, R., & Hull, A. J. (1964). Information, acoustic confusion and memory 
span. British Journal of Psychology, 55, 429-432. 
DeSoto, L. B., London, M., & Handel, M. S. (1965). Social reasoning and spatial 
paralogic. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2, 513-521. 
Espino, O., Santamaría, C., & Garcìa-Madruga, J. A. (2000). Figure and difficulty 
in syllogistic reasoning Current Psychology of Cognition 19, 417-428. 
Espino, O., Santamaría, C., Meseguer, E., & Carreiras, M.  (2005). Early and late 
processes in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence from eye-movements. Cognition, 98, B1-B9. 
Evans, J. St. B. T., Newstead, S. E., & Byrne, R. M. J. (1993). Human reasoning: 
The psychology of deduction. Hove, U.K.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Fangmeier, T., Knauff, M., Ruff, C. C., & Sloutsky, V. (2006). fMRI evidence for a 
three-stage model of deductive reasoning. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18, 320-
334. 
Fleming, P., Ball, L. J., Ormerod, T. C., & Collins, A. F. (2006). Analogue versus 
propositional representation in congenitally blind individuals. Psychonomic Bulletin and 
Review, 13, 1049-1055.  
Garnham, A., & Oakhill, J. V. (2005). Accounting for belief bias in a mental model 
framework: Comment on Klauer, Musch, and Naumer (2000). Psychological Review, 
112, 509-518. 
Geurts, B. (2003). Reasoning with quantifiers. Cognition, 86, 223-251. 
  Phonological and Visual Distinctiveness 
 32 
Gilhooly, K. J. (2004). Working memory and reasoning. In J. P. Leighton and R. J. 
Sternberg (Eds.), The nature of reasoning (pp. 49-77). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Hitch, G. J., Halliday, M. S., Schaafstal, A. M., & Schraagen, J. M. C. (1988). 
Visual working memory in young children. Memory and Cognition, 16, 120-132. 
Hue, C., & Ericsson, J. R. (1988). Short-term memory for Chinese characters and 
radicals. Memory and Cognition, 16, 196-205. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1996). Images, models and propositional representations. In 
M. de Vega, M. J. Intons-Peterson, M. Marschark, P. N. Johnson-Laird, & M. Denis 
(Eds.), Models of visuospatial cognition (pp. 90-127). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1998). Imagery, visualization, and thinking. In J. Hochberg 
(Ed.), Perception and cognition at century’s end (pp. 441-467). San Diego: Academic 
Press. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2005). Mental models and thought. In K. J. Holyoak and R. 
G. Morrison (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 185-208). 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Bara, B. G. (1984). Syllogistic inference. Cognition, 16, 1-
62. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (1991). Deduction. Hove: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N., Byrne, R., & Tabossi, P. (1989). Reasoning by model: The 
case of multiple quantifiers. Psychological Review, 96, 658-673. 
  Phonological and Visual Distinctiveness 
 33 
Knauff, M., Fangmeier, T., Ruff, C. C., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2003). Reasoning, 
models, and images: Behavioral measures and cortical activity. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 4, 559-573. 
Knauff, M., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2002). Visual imagery can impede reasoning. 
Memory and Cognition, 30, 363-371. 
Knauff, M., & May, E. (2006). Mental imagery, reasoning, and blindness. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 59, 161-177. 
Knauff, M. & Schlieder, C. (2005). Spatial inference: No difference between 
mental images and models. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, 589-590. 
Logie, R. H., Della Sala, S., Wynn, V., and Baddeley, A. D. (2000). Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 53A, 626-646. 
Mani, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1982). The mental representation of spatial 
descriptions. Memory and Cognition, 10, 181-187. 
Miyake, A., & Shah, P. (1999). (Eds.). Models of working memory: Mechanisms of 
active maintenance and executive control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Oberauer, K., Hörnig, R., Weidenfeld, A., & Wilhelm, O. (2005). Effects of 
directionality in deductive reasoning: II. Premise integration and conclusion evaluation. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58A, 1225-1247. 
Quayle, J. D., & Ball, L. J. (2000). Working memory, metacognitive uncertainty 
and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
53A, 1202-1223. 
Rips, L. J. (1994). The psychology of proof: Deductive reasoning in human 
thinking. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Schaeken, W., Van Der Henst, J.-B., & Schroyens, W. (2006). The mental models 
theory of relational reasoning: Premises’ relevance, conclusions’ phrasing and cognitive 
  Phonological and Visual Distinctiveness 
 34 
economy. In W. Schaeken, A. Vandierendonck, W. Schroyens, & G. d’Ydewalle (Eds.), 
The mental models theory of reasoning: Extensions and refinements (pp. 129-150). 
Mahwah, NJ: LEA. 
Shaver, P., Pierson, L., & Lang, S. (1975). Converging evidence for the functional 
significance of imagery in problem solving. Cognition, 3, 359-375. 
Sternberg, R. J. (1980). Representation and process in linear syllogistic reasoning. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 109, 119-159.  
Stupple, E. J. N., & Ball, L. J. (2005). An inspection-time analysis of figural 
processing direction in syllogistic reasoning. In B. G. Bara, L. Barsalou, & M. Bucciarelli 
(Eds.), Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science 
Society (pp. 2092-2097). Alpha, NJ: Sheridan Printing. 
Stupple, E. J. N., & Ball, L. J. (2007). Figural effects in a syllogistic evaluation 
paradigm: An inspection-time analysis. Experimental Psychology, 54, 120-127.  
Stupple, E. J. N., & Ball, L. J. (2008). Belief-logic conflict resolution in syllogistic 
reasoning: Inspection-time evidence for a parallel-process model. Thinking and 
Reasoning, 14, 168-181. 
Vandierendonck, A., Dierckx, V., & De Vooght, G. (2004). Mental model 
construction in linear reasoning: Evidence for the construction of initial annotated 
models. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 57A, 1369-1391. 
 
 
  Phonological and Visual Distinctiveness 
 35 
Table 1. 




 Distinctive Phonological               
Content 
Word Set 1 Bubs, Bebs, Babs  Word Set 5 Zaps, Toks, Yugs 
Word Set 2 Fuds, Fods, Feds  Word Set 6 Fubs, Haps, Beks 
Word Set 3 Horks, Herks, Harks  Word Set 7 Paps, Harps, Fids 
Word Set 4 Jeks, Juks, Jiks  Word Set 8 Yogs, Keps, Zuks 
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Table 2. 
Percentage of Conclusions Accepted as a Function of Logic and Phonological 








 Phonological Distinctiveness  
Logical Status Non-Distinctive Distinctive Overall 
    Valid 72 77 75 
    Invalid 67 61 64 
Difference 5 17 11 
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Table 3. 





Non-Distinctive Visual                   
Content 
 Distinctive Visual                      
Content 
Symbol Set 1 
 
 
Symbol Set 5 
 
Symbol Set 2 
 
 
Symbol Set 6 
 
Symbol Set 3 
 
 
Symbol Set 7 
 
Symbol Set 4 
 
 
Symbol Set 8 
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Table 4. 
Percentage of Conclusions Accepted as a Function of Content, Logic and Distinctiveness 
in Experiment 2 
 
 Content 





Distinctive Overall  Non-
Distinctive 
Distinctive Overall 
    Valid 72 78 75  81 82 82 
    Invalid 68 61 65  74 69 72 
Difference 4 17 11  7 13 10 




 Target Syllogisms Used in Experiment 1, Showing the Logical Status of Presented 
Conclusions
Non-Distinctive Phonological Content Distinctive Phonological Content 
Some Bubs are Bebs 
No Bebs are Babs 
Therefore, Some Bubs are not Babs  
[Valid] 
Some Zaps are Toks 
No Toks are Yugs 
Therefore, Some Zaps are not Yugs 
[Valid] 
 
Some Fuds are Fods 
No Fods are Feds 
Therefore, Some Feds are not Fuds 
[Invalid] 
 
Some Fubs are Haps 
No Haps are Beks 
Therefore, Some Beks are not Fubs  
[Invalid] 
 
No Herks are Horks 
Some Harks are Herks 
Therefore, Some Harks are not Horks  
[Valid] 
 
No Harks are Paps 
Some Fids are Harks 
Therefore, Some Fids are not Paps 
[Valid] 
 
No Juks are Jeks 
Some Jiks are Juks 
Therefore, Some Jeks are not Jiks  
[Invalid] 
 
No Keps are Yogs 
Some Zucks are Keps 
Therefore, Some Yogs are not Zucks  
[Invalid] 
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Appendix B 
Target Syllogisms Used in Experiment 2, Showing the Logical Status of  
Presented Conclusions 
Non-Distinctive Visual Content Distinctive Visual Content 
Some are  
No are  
Therefore, Some are not    
[Valid] 
Some are  
No are  
Therefore, Some are not  
[Valid] 
 
Some are  
No are  
Therefore, Some are not  
[Invalid] 
 
Some are  
No are    
Therefore, Some are not  
[Invalid] 
 
No are  
Some are  
Therefore, Some are not  
[Valid] 
 
No are  
Some are  
Therefore, Some are not  
[Valid] 
 
No are  
Some are  
Therefore, Some are not  
[Invalid] 
 
No are  
Some are  
Therefore, Some are not  
[Invalid] 
